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CAPrrAL PUNISHMENT
INTRODUCTION
Although each state within the jurisdiction of the Tenth Circuit may im-
pose a death sentence on eligible defendants,' only cases originating in the
state and federal courts of Oklahoma reached the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals during the 1995-1996 survey period.2 This Survey explores the death
penalty issues addressed by the court in these cases. Part I summarizes the
history of the death penalty and the treatment of capital punishment in the
American judicial system. Part II examines issues raised in the sentencing
phase of a capital case after determination of guilt. Part m1 explores the impact
of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 on a
defendant's petitions for habeas corpus, the fundamental process by which
state and federal courts evaluate the constitutionality of particular death sen-
tences.
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND
Death has been inflicted as a punishment throughout history? In ancient
times, torture and death were compounded, because death was considered
insufficient as a punishment." Most scholars seem to agree that prior to the
development of organized civilizations, individuals killed to avenge wrongs
done to them and their families.5 The first formal criminal codes reflected
organized society's recognition of this private form of justice. They incorporat-
ed in their criminal laws a distinction between public wrongs, such as treason
which was punishable by the state, and private wrongs, for which retribution
could be sought by the individual harmed.6 Eventually, this distinction disap-
peared, and many criminal codes established death as a standard punishment
for a wide variety of offenses.7 In seventh century Athens, death was
considered the appropriate penalty for most crimes.' During the Middle Ages,
1. Each state has legislation establishing the standards that must be met before a defendant
may be sentenced to death. See CoLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103 (1986 & Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-4624 (1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-14-1 to -16 (Michie 1984); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21,
§ 701.7 (1983 & Supp. 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207 (1995 & Supp. 1996); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 6-2-101(b) (Michie 1996).
2. The survey period extended from September 1, 1995 through August 31, 1996. The capi-
tal cases heard by the Tenth Circuit during this period include: Hatch v. Oklahoma, 92 F.3d 1012
(10th Cir. 1996); United States v. McCullah, 87 F.3d 1136 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v.
McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087 (10th Cir. 1996); Castro v. Oklahoma, 71 F.3d 1502 (10th Cir. 1995).
3. GARY E. MCCUEN & R.A. BAUMGART, REvIVING THE DEATH PENALTY 8 (1985).
4. 1d.
5. Rudolph J. Gerber, Death Is Not Worth It, 28 ARiz. ST. LJ. 335, 335 (1996).
6. STEPHEN A. FLANDERS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 4 (1991).
7. Id.; Gerber, supra note 5, at 336.
8. FLANDERS, supra note 6, at 4; Gerber, supra note 5, at 336.
375
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
it was a common form of punishment throughout Europe and Asia.9 Over the
next several centuries, the infliction of death became even more widespread.
By 1780, British criminal laws, called the "Bloody Code," contained three
hundred and fifty capital crimes." Due to active reform movements in
Britain, however, the number of capital crimes was drastically reduced by the
mid 1800s."
Although the American colonies adopted the death penalty in their crimi-
nal codes, historians, citing low rates of executions, conclude that it was rarely
practiced. 2 When a hanging did occur, however, the body of the dead was
displayed for days, or even months, following the execution." The establish-
ment of the first modem prison in 1790 helped alleviate the state's need for
capital punishment; confinement of convicts in prisons provided a new alter-
native to execution. 4 Many states abolished public executions by 1845; in-
stead, death sentences were carried out in the prison yard or inside the prison
building. 5 Despite consistent efforts by abolitionist and reform movements,
the death penalty remained entrenched in American jurisprudence. 6
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court decision in Furman v.
Georgia7 temporarily bolstered the abolitionists' campaign to terminate
executions. In a five-four decision, the Court held that the death sentence
issued by a jury, which was given no guidance in its determination, was
unconstitutional. 8 The Court determined that Georgia's capital sentencing
statute (and indirectly, the death penalty statutes of virtually all other states)
invariably led to the arbitrary execution of prisoners because the system lacked
guidelines, leaving juries to determine the crucial decision between life and
death without structure." Unbridled jury discretion, according to the Court,
allowed racism to infect the decision-making process, creating a system in
which the race of the victim and the race of the defendant affected whether
the defendant was executed.' Death sentences were "so wantonly and so
9. FLANDERS, supra note 6, at 5; Gerber, supra note 5, at 336.
10. FLANDERS, supra note 6, at 5.
11. Id. at 5-6; FRANKLIN E. ZIMPRiO & GORDON HAwKINs, CAPrrAL PUNiSHMENT AND THE
AMERICAN AGENDA 12 (1986); see also Gerber, supra note 5, at 337-41.
12. ZIMRiNG & HAwKINs, supra note 11, at 28. Some colonies adopted harsh criminal codes
during colonization, including death as an appropriate punishment for witchcraft, blasphemy and
adultery. The codes grew even more harsh until the Revolutionary War, though execution was
rarely practiced. FLANDERS, supra note 6, at 6. In addition, historians assert that several states,
including Michigan, Rhode Island and Wisconsin, had eliminated the death penalty for all crimes
except treason by 1853, long before the first European countries voted to eradicate the death pen-
alty. ZIMRINO & HAwKiNs, supra note 11, at 28.
13. Jonathan S. Abernethy, The Methodology of Death: Reexamining the Deterrence Ratio-
nale, 27 COLUM. HuM. RTs. L. REv. 379, 389 (1996).
14. FLANDERS, supra note 6, at 6.
15. Abernethy, supra note 13, at 390.
16. FLANDERS, supra note 6, at 7; Gerber, supra note 5, at 340-41.
17. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
18. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40. Nine separate opinions were filed in Furman, none clearly
indicating the direction that the law would take. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober
Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punish-
ment, 109 HARv. L. REV. 355, 362-63 (1995).




freakishly imposed"' that the executions violated the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.' By rejecting Georgia's
established criminal sentencing code, the Supreme Court avoided determining
whether capital punishment itself was constitutional. '
More than thirty states reacted to this ruling by revising their capital
sentencing statutes to include guidelines to assist the jury in consideration of
the particular nature of the defendant and the offense.24 In 1976, the Supreme
Court impliedly upheld many of these statutes in Gregg v. Georgia,' finding
that the death penalty was not invariably unconstitutional.26 The Court,
however, required that adequate sentencing information and guidance must be
provided to the sentencing body in order to avoid the arbitrariness rejected by
the Furman Court. In addition, the Gregg Court held that the sentencing
authority must find the existence of at least one statutory aggravating factor
before sentencing the defendant to death, thereby further limiting the risk that
the jury's decision-making process would be infected by arbitrariness.'
II. DUE PROCESS CONCERNS IN THE SENTENCING PHASE
A. The Weighing of Aggravating and Mitigating Factors in the Sentencing
Phase
1. Background
During the sentencing phase of trial, the jury considers all of the relevant
aggravating and mitigating circumstances surrounding the offense. Aggravating
factors refer to those aspects related to the crime which make the offense com-
mitted more severe than the offense by itself." The jury considers statutory
aggravators (enumerated in the capital sentencing statute) in addition to the
non-statutory factors presented by the prosecution." These aggravating fac-
tors cannot be vague;3 rather they must help the jury narrow the class of
death-eligible defendants so that only those deserving of the death penalty are
executed. 2 The jury also considers evidence of all relevant statutory and non-
21. Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
22. The Eighth Amendment provides excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
23. Furman, 408 U.S. at 240.
24. BARRY NAKEUL & KENNETH A. HARDY, THE ARBrrRARINEss OF THE DEATH PENALTY
28 (1987).
25. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
26. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206-07.
27. 1d. at 195.
28. Id. at 206-07.
29. FLANDEns, supra note 6, at 12. Aggravators may include commission of murder for
pecuniary gain (OKLA STAT. tit. 21, § 701.12(3) (1983)), commission of a felony at the time of
the murder (UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(d) (1995 & Supp. 1996)), and commission of mur-
der by an individual previously convicted of a felony (COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(5)(b) (1986
& Supp. 1996)).
30. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878 (1983).
31. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 420 (1980).
32. Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 360 (1988). The narrowing function of the aggra-
vating circumstance may occur at either the guilt or the penalty phase of the trial. Lowenfield v.
Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244-45 (1988).
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statutory mitigating circumstances presented by the defense.33 The prosecu-
tion and the defense offer a great deal of information for the jury to weigh in
its deliberations, however, the jury must conclude that at least one statutory
aggravating factor exists beyond a reasonable doubt before the defendant can
be executed.'
Some states have established a system in which jurors balance the
aggravators against the mitigators.35 In those so-called weighing states, when
the jury determines the aggravators outweigh the mitigators, it may sentence
the defendant to death. Other states, non-weighing or threshold states, must
merely determine that one statutory aggravating factor was proven beyond a
reasonable doubt; once this determination is made, the defendant becomes
death-eligible.'
2. United States v. McCullah
3 7
a. Facts
A California drug-trafficking organization had recruited McCullah to help
kill a man whom they suspected of stealing drugs from them.' McCullah's
role included luring the intended victim to an ambush site where the man
would be killed. 9 Unable to lure the suspect away, McCullah substituted an
employee of the intended victim and took him to the ambush site, where he
was executed by another member of McCulah's team.' Several months later,
members of the drug-trafficking organization cooperated with police, providing
information leading to McCullah's arrest for his involvement in the drug con-
spiracy and murder.' McCullah was convicted.' During the sentencing
phase, the jury determined that there was enough evidence to prove that the
statutory aggravators existed beyond a reasonable doubt, and that this evi-
dence, coupled with evidence of non-statutory aggravators, outweighed the
mitigating factors which the defense presented. 3 Based on these findings, the
33. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978). Mitigating factors may include evidence
that, among others, the defendant was acting under another's control (UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-
207(3)(c) (1995 & Supp. 1996)), that the defendant did not have the capacity to appreciate the
criminality of his or her conduct (WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(j)(vi) (Michie 1996)), and tend to
cause the jury to resist imposing the harshest punishment possible.
34. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206-07.
35. Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222 (1992); Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990).
36. For the Supreme Court's explanation of the distinction between weighing and threshold
states, and the effect on appellate reweighing of aggravating and mitigating factors, see Stringer v.
Black, 503 U.S. 222, 229-32 (1992); Srikanth Srinivasan, Capital Sentencing Doctrine and the
Weighing-NonWeighing Distinction, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1347, 1365-67 (1995).
37. 76 F.3d 1087 (10th Cir. 1996).
38. McCullah, 76 F.3d at 1095.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1097.
42. Id.
43. l The prosecution submitted four statutory and four non-statutory aggravating factors
for the jury to consider during the penalty phase of the trial. The jury determined that all eight
aggravating factors existed. The statutory factors included that 1) the defendant "intentionally
engaged in conduct intending that the victim be killed or that lethal force he employed against the
victim, which resulted in the death of the victim" (21 U.S.C. § 848(n)(1)(C) (1994)); 2) the defen-
[Vol. 74:2
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jury sentenced McCullah to death. 4 McCullah appealed this decision, among
others, to the Tenth Circuit, arguing that multiple errors at the trial level led to
his convictions and death sentence.' He asserted that the aggravating factors
presented by the prosecution overlapped, skewing the weighing process con-
ducted by the jury during the penalty phase.4
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit agreed with McCullah's claim that some of the
aggravators overlapped.' The court found that "intentionally engag[ing] in
conduct intending that the victim be killed... which resulted in the death of
the victim"4 significantly overlapped with the non-statutory aggravator that
the defendant committed the acts with which he was charged in the indict-
ment, including that the defendant intentionally killed or caused the killing of
an individual.' Similarly, the court asserted that the statutory aggravator
relating to the defendant's intentional conduct, which was aimed at causing the
death of the victim," also duplicated the requirement set forth in the statutory
aggravator that the defendant acted with intent, knowingly creating a grave
risk of death to the victim, which resulted in the death of the victim."1 The
court held that such "double counting of aggravating factors, especially under
a weighing scheme, has a tendency to skew the weighing process and creates
the risk that the death sentence will be imposed arbitrarily and thus, uncon-
stitutionally."'52 Weighing duplicative factors creates the risk that one aggra-
vating circumstance will be given undue weight, essentially penalizing the
defendant twice for the same act.53 The court determined that this was im-
proper and necessitated the reweighing of aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances.' Although the court affirmed each of McCullah's convictions, it re-
manded his case for resentencing.55
Four months later, the Tenth Circuit denied the defendant's request for a
dant intentionally engaged in conduct which the defendant knew would create a grave risk of
death to an individual, and that conduct did result in the death of an individual (21 U.S.C. §
848(n)(1)(D) (1994)); 3) the defendant committed the act with the expectation of some type of
pecuniary gain (21 U.S.C. § 848(n)(7) (1994)); and 4) the defendant committed the act after sub-
stantial planning (21 U.S.C. § 848(n)(8) (1994)). McCu/lah, 76 F.3d at 1108. In addition, the non-
statutory factors submitted by the prosecution and found by the jury included 1) use of a deadly
weapon in the murder, 2) the defendant had a record of prior felony convictions; 3) the defendant
had committed the acts detailed in the indictment; and 4) previous attempts to rehabilitate the
defendant had been unsuccessful. Id. at 1106.
44. McCullah, 76 F.3d at 1097.
45. Id. at 1087.
46. Id. at 1111.
47. Id.
48. 21 U.S.C. § 848(n)(1)(C) (1994).
49. McCullah, 76 F.3d at 1111; United States v. McCullah, 87 F.3d 1136, 1138 (10th Cir.
1996).
50. 21 U.S.C. § 848(n)(1)(C).
51. 21 U.S.C. § 848(nXI)(D) (1994).
52. McCullah, 76 F.3d at 1111.
53. I
54. Id at 1112.
55. Id at 1114.
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rehearing, as well as the government's request for a rehearing en banc, and
affirmed its earlier decision that some of the aggravating circumstances were
duplicative.' The court reiterated that the multiple aggravators were predicat-
ed on the same act of identifying the victim and driving him to the ambush
site, and therefore could not be the basis for two separate aggravating circum-
stances.57
3. Other Circuits
The issue of duplicative aggravators was raised before the Eighth Circuit
in Ruiz v. Norris," where the defendant asserted that an aggravating circum-
stance duplicated an element of the definition of death-eligible homicides
presented to the jury. 9 Relying on Lowenfield v. Phelps," the Eighth Circuit
held that the narrowing of the class of death-eligible defendants occurred in
the definition of the crime, which was so specific that the duplication of the
element of the offense and the aggravator was inconsequential. 6 The court
asserted that this mere duplication "does not render Arkansas's death-penalty
scheme unconstitutional or violate the petitioners' rights."
In the Fifth Circuit, United States v. Florese also raised the issue of re-
dundancy among aggravating factors." As in McCullah, the jury sentenced
the defendant to death upon finding that evidence beyond a reasonable doubt
proved that the defendant intentionally killed and intentionally engaged in
conduct, intending that the victim be killed, for two of the murders with which
the defendant was charged. They also found that the defendant engaged in
conduct intending the victim to be killed in a third murder.61 The defendant
argued that two of his death sentences were invalid because they relied on
duplicative aggravating factors.' The Fifth Circuit determined, however, that
the aggravators did not simply describe the same conduct in two different
ways; rather, according to the court, an individual who personally murders a
victim and pays another individual to kill has a "dual intent."  The jury's
weighing of duplicative factors, according to the court, is permissible when
those factors are supported by separate acts.' The court upheld the validity
56. McCullah, 87 F.3d at 1137.
57. 1d at 1137. The court argued that
"[diriving the victim to the murder site (intentionally engaging in conduct intending the
victim be killed) and driving the victim to the murder site (engaging in conduct which
creates a grave risk of death) is still the same conduct .... The same act can be de-
scribed in several ways, but it is still the same act."
I& at 1138.
58. 71 F.3d 1404 (8th Cir. 1995).
59. Ruiz, 71 F.3d at 1407-08.
60. 484 U.S. 231, 244-45 (1988) (asserting that the narrowing function of an aggravating
circumstance may occur at either the guilt or penalty phase of a trial).
61. Ruz, 71 F.3d at 1408.
62. 1M
63. 63 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1995).
64. Flores, 63 F.3d at 1372.
65. Id. at 1366-67.





of the aggravators and affirmed the death sentences.'
4. Analysis
When a jury undertakes the process of weighing mitigating factors against
aggravating factors of a crime, the jury must consider all relevant evidence to
best understand the character of the defendant and the circumstances of the
offense. 70 One scholar argues that the jury's consideration of aggravators and
mitigators, however, has the tendency to make the decision both easier and
harder.7' The decision is harder because the jury is required to master diffi-
cult statutory language and apply it; the decision is easier because the jury
rationalizes it based on the capital sentencing framework provided by the state,
which requires the weighing of mitigating and aggravating factors.' In reali-
ty, however, these factors are often essentially incommensurate with one an-
other, requiring the jury to make a virtually impossible determination. 7 A
decision that requires the jury to conclude that amount of viciousness which is
offset by the defendant's limitations gives "the illusion that the decision can
be reduced to a formula that obviates the need for the exercise of moral judg-
ment."74
While the Tenth Circuit Court asserts that duplicative factors will likely
produce a "skewed" result, that notion presupposes a result that is not
"skewed." The court's discussion of a "skewed" result indicates that there is a
correct, or scientifically accurate, result possible; however, in pitting a mitiga-
tor against an aggravator, a jury is compelled to make a subjective, deeply
personal evaluation.
Although some aggravating factors enumerated in 21 U.S.C. § 848(n), the
statute applied in McCullah, may permit an objective evaluation other factors
are less objective." Whether the defendant knew that he would create a
"grave" risk of harm to a person requires a subjective analysis of "gravity,"
"risk," and "harm." While examining the weight of duplicative factors may
disrupt a balance perceived by the court, that "balance" is little more than an
illusion.
69. Id. at 1378.
70. Eric Wade Richardson, Note, Due Process Requirements of Jury Charges in Capital
Cases: Simmons v. South Carolina, 114 S.Ct. 2187 (1994), 64 U. CIN. L. REv. 755, 759 (1996)
(citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 603 (1978)).
71. Jordan M. Steiker, The Limits of Legal Language: Decisionmaking in Capital Cases, 94
MicH. L. REv. 2590, 2613-14 (1996).
72. ld. at 2614.
73. Id.
74. ld.
75. Objective factors may include an analysis of whether the defendant has ever been con-
victed of a felony, 21 U.S.C. § 848 (n)(3), as compared to an evaluation of the risk that a defen-
dant may constitute a danger to society in the future.
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B. Psychiatric Evaluations for Capital Defendants
1. Background
In Ake v. Oklahoma,76 the. Supreme Court established the indigent
defendant's right to the assistance of a psychiatric expert when the defendant
makes a threshold showing that "his sanity is likely to be a significant factor
in his defense." Under those circumstances, the state must provide the de-
fendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will examine the defendant and
assist in preparation and presentation of the defense at trial. 8 In addition, the
Ake Court asserted that due process standards require that when the state pres-
ents the defendant's continuing threat to society as an aggravating circum-
stance, the defendant is entitled to a court-appointed psychiatrist to rebut the
state's assertions.' Several years later, the Tenth Circuit reiterated these re-
quirements, and affirmed that the defendant's claim that his or her sanity will
be an issue at trial must be "clear and genuine, one that constitutes a 'close'
question which may well be decided one way or the other."
2. Castro v. Oklahomas'
a. Facts
Castro was charged with felony murder and armed robbery of a fast food
restaurant in 19 8 4 .' When the police apprehended him, he confessed to rob-
bing the restaurant with an unloaded gun." He also admitted that the restau-
rant manager attempted to defend herself with a knife during the middle of the
robbery and that he gained control of the knife, stabbed the manager multiple
t*nes, and killed her.4 Prior to trial, Castro's court-appointed attorney re-
peatedly expressed concern that the defendant's depression and confusion
about the murder hindered his ability to assist in his own defense.' Castro's
attorney requested a psychological review of his client, and made repeated
requests for money to enable Castro to pursue an expert psychiatric exam,
though no funds were provided.'M Instead, defense counsel arranged for a
psychiatrist, who was a specialist in pediatric and geriatric analysis, as well as
a friend of counsel, to examine Castro.' Although the psychiatrist agreed to
evaluate the defendant, he refused to testify on Castro's behalf.' At trial, the
jury convicted Castro and sentenced him to death for the murder.89
76. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
'77. Ake, 470 U.S. at 82-83.
78. Id. at 83.
79. Id. at 83-84.
80. Liles v. Saffle, 945 F.2d 333, 336 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting Cartwright v. Maynard, 802
F.2d 1203, 1211 (10th Cir. 1986)).
81. 71 F.3d 1502 (10th Cir. 1995).
82. Castro, 71 F.3d at 1504.
83. Id. at 1505.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1506.
86. Id. at 1507.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1507 n.6.
v 89. During the penalty phase, the state presented two statutory aggravators to justify Castro's
[Vol. 74:2
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In preparation for the petition for habeas corpus, Castro submitted to a
comprehensive psychological and neurological exam.'o Examination results
indicated that Castro suffered from paranoid thought disorder and brain dam-
age.9' A social worker's examination of the defendant uncovered new issues
as well.' Castro's habeas petition to the Tenth Circuit asserted that he was
denied due process when the court refused to grant him access to an expert
psychiatrist.93
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit determined that the denial of expert psychiatric assis-
tance during the penalty phase of Castro's trial did not constitute harmless
error.94 The court maintained that Castro had established that his sanity could
be a significant mitigating factor at trial, and therefore should have been ap-
pointed an expert psychiatrist.95 According to the court, the state's presenta-
tion of future dangerousness triggered the Ake duty to appoint expert assis-
tance. 96
The court found that the testimony of both a forensic psychiatrist and
social worker would have framed the mitigating testimony in a manner not
achieved at trial.' This different framework might have allowed the jury
greater insight into the defendant's circumstances, placing the defendant's
crime "in an altogether different and appropriate context." g In addition, the
execution: "(1) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel; and (2) Mr. Castro consti-
tuted a continuing threat to society." d. at 1506; OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 701.12(4),(7) (1983 &
Supp. 1997). Castro's presentation of mitigating evidence included his rationale for committing the
murder. He stated that "something [was] wrong with [his] mind." In addition, Castro described his
unhappy childhood, which included his devastation upon learning that his mother worked as a
prostitute, being seduced by his mother, and witnessing his brother bludgeon their father to death.
The jury determined that both aggravating factors were present, justifying the imposition of a
death sentence.
On direct appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals struck down the "especially
heinous, atrocious or cruel" aggravator for insufficient grounds. Castro, 71 F.3d at 1506 (citing
Castro v. State, 745 P.2d 394, 408 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987)). In determining that Castro was a
future danger, the jury relied on three factors: Castro's pretrial escape from jail, his confession to
the commission of a prior murder, and his confession to the commission of two prior armed rob-
beries. Castro spoke extensively of these other crimes during the penalty phase of his trial. Id. at
1506.
90. Castro, 71 F.3d at 1509.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1510. According to the examining social worker, the pervasive addiction to drugs
and alcohol among Castro's family members was an important issue that should have been raised
at trial. Id. In addition, the possibility that Castro suffered from Fetal Alcohol Syndrome, the lack
of positive male role models in the defendant's life, and his diagnostic classification of Paranoid
Personality Disorder were all issues that should have been made known to the jury. According to
the social worker, without this information the jury could not make an accurate determination to
sentence the defendant to death. Id.
93. Id. at 1513.
94. Id. at 1515-16. The court conducted a harmless error analysis and determined the error
had "substantial and injurious effect" on the jury's determination (quoting Kotteakos v. United
States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)).
95. Id. at 1515.
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Tenth Circuit concluded that the psychiatrist's refusal to testify on the
defendant's behalf made his assistance to Castro inadequate." The expert's
role in taking the stand on the defendant's behalf is inherent in Ake.'0
3. Other Circuits
In a similar case,'' the Fourth Circuit determined that the trial court
committed two errors in the sentencing phase of a capital murder case. Spe-
cifically, the trial court erred in admitting the prosector's evidence that the
defendant constituted a future danger to society and by depriving the defendant
of expert psychiatric testimony to rebut the future dangerousness claim."°
Citing the Tenth Circuit's decision in Castro,"3 the Fourth Circuit applied
the harmless error test to the trial court's mistakes.'" Because Virginia is a
non-weighing state, the court determined that despite the errors made at the
trial level, "there [was] no constitutional violation."
'10
4. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit correctly determined that Castro was denied due pro-
cess when the trial court failed to appoint an expert to assist him in his de-
fense. The jury's consideration of all relevant mitigating evidence, including
an explanation by a psychiatrist, is a well-settled principle in capital punish-
ment jurisprudence." 6 Additionally, the Supreme Court has recognized that a
capital defendant must be permitted to rebut or deny evidence presented
against him at trial." Therefore, when the state presented evidence that Cas-
tro constituted a future danger to the community--an elusive claim-the de-
fendant should have been permitted to rebut this evidence." Due to the am-
biguity of a claim of future dangerousness, juries must make difficult determi-
nations, and must therefore be afforded accurate and relevant information from
both the defense and the prosecution."
The Ake Court asserted that an individual's poverty should not be determi-
native of whether the defendant has an "opportunity to participate meaning-
fully in a judicial proceeding in which his liberty is at stake."'"' Access "to
99. Id. at 1515. The court also suggested that the doctor's expertise in child and gerialric
psychiatry may have rendered him unqualified as an expert in a capital murder trial. Id.
100. Id.
101. Tuggle v. Netherland, 79 F.3d 1386 (4th Cir. 1996).
102. Tuggle, 79 F.3d at 1389.
103. Castro, 71 F.3d at 1502.
104. Tuggle, 79 F.3d at 1392-93.
105. Id. at 1393 (citing Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 232 (1992)).
106. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
107. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
108. Joseph T. McCann, Standards for Expert Testimony in New York Death Penalty Cases,
N.Y. ST. BJ., July-Aug. 1996, at 30. Juries rely on evidence presented by both sides to determine
whether the defendant constitutes a continuing threat to society; however, these projections may
be unreliable. "Predictions by mental health professionals have been shown to be highly inaccu-
rate." Id.; see Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 81 (1985).
109. Ake, 470 U.S. at 81-82.
110. Id. at 76; see also Karla C. McGrath, Sommers v. Commonwealth: An Indigent Criminal
Defendant's Right to Publicly Funded Expert Assistance Other Than the Assistance of Counsel, 84
[Vol. 74:2
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the raw materials integral to the building of an effective defense," and not
simply to the courthouse doors, is required to meet the standards of the Due
Process Clause of the United States Constitution."' By compelling the ap-
pointment of an expert psychiatrist to assist in Castro's defense, the Tenth Cir-
cuit appropriately upheld the requirements of Ake and the Due Process Clause
of the Constitution.
m. THE IMPACT OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY
ACT OF 1996 ON CAPITAL CASES
A. Background
The Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged the uniqueness of a
death sentence;"2 the irrevocability of execution demands procedural safe-
guards to ensure that the death penalty is administered according to constitu-
tional standards." 3 In addition to safeguards established at the trial level, the
appeals process helps to protect against the unconstitutional administration of
the death penalty."4
Two avenues are available for the capital defendant challenging a death
sentence. Initially, the defendant appeals the conviction in state court, a pro-
cess called direct appeal."' If there is a federal question, the direct appeal
terminates when the Supreme Court acts on the defendant's petition for writ of
certiorari. When this occurs, a "presumption of finality and legality attaches to
the conviction and sentence."
'" 6
The defendant may then file a petition for relief under the writ of habeas
corpus, a civil claim that allows post-conviction review. A convicted defen-
dant, "restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any
treaty or law of the United States," may petition the court for relief under the
doctrine of habeas corpus."7 This petition for review allows the defendant an
opportunity to contest those convictions and sentences that are illegally ob-
tained at the trial level.""
KY. LJ. 387 (1995) (discussing the rights of indigent defendants).
111. Ake, 470 U.S. at 77; U.S. CONST. ART. XIV, § 1.
112. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 329 (1985); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280, 305 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 270 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
113. FLANDERS, supra note 7, at 26.
114. Mark Miller, Twenty-Fifth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: Appellate Review of
Sentences, 84 GEo. LJ. 1389, 1389-91 (1996).
115. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983). When a defendant is convicted and sentenced
under federal law in federal court, the defendant pursues his direct appeal in the federal courts. Id.
116. Id. at 887.
117. The Judiciary Act of 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 StaL 385; The United States Constitution
provides that "the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. In
Latin, "habeas corpus" means "you have the body." BLACK's LAw DIcnoNARY 709 (6th ed.
1990).
118. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214 (to be codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2266) [hereinafter Anti-Terrorism Act]. In
addition to altering the provisions for habeas corpus procedures, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 also added 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261-66, which contain rules for special
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Concerns for finality of convictions and federalism have limited the po-
tentially broad scope of the habeas corpus doctrine."9 Although habeas re-
view is not conducted to correct errors of fact, factual allegations may be re-
viewed if they pertain to a constitutional violation.' ° With few exceptions,
the petitioner may rely only on law available at the time his conviction be-
came final.' In addition, a defendant may be procedurally barred from rais-
ing a claim if he failed to raise it first in state court." When a reviewing
court determines that an error did occur at the trial level, relief will only be
granted to the petitioner if the error caused a "substantial and injurious effect
or influence in determining the jury's verdict."'"
Post-conviction review is available at both the state and federal levels. A
petitioner's post-conviction review at the state level focuses on violations of
the state and federal constitution.'24 When state habeas procedures terminate,
federal habeas corpus proceedings are the next available means of appeal for
the capital defendant."2 Filing of a second or successive petition for habeas
relief is permissible; however, the standard for acceptance of those petitions
was recently modified by Congress."
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 significantly
reduced the breadth of habeas corpus."2 The Act established a statute of lim-
habeas corpus procedures, applicable when states appoint counsel for the indigent defendant. Un-
der those circumstances, the statute of limitations for filing of a habeas petition is six months.
John H. Blume & David P. Voisin, An Introduction to Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Pro-
cedure, 47 S.C. L. REV. 271, 278 (1996).
119. Blume & Voisin, supra note 118, at 273.
120. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993).
121. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 290 (1989). "New" constitutional laws were defined by
the Teague Court as those which were not dictated by precedent at the time the defendant's con-
viction became final. Teague, 489 U.S. at 290. Retroactive application of a new constitutional rule
is permissible only when 1) the new rule decriminalizes behavior which had been previously con-
sidered criminal; or 2) if application of the new rule is required by the observance of "'those
procedures that... are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'" Id at 307 (quoting Desist v.
United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). In 1991, the Supreme Court refined
the definition of a new rule as one that is "susceptible to debate among reasonable minds." Butier
v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415 (1990); see Alan W. Clarke, Procedural Labyrinths and the Injus-
tice of Death: A Critique of Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, 30 U. RICH. L. REv. 303, 304-27
(1996).
122. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90-91 (1977).
123. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 619 (1993).
124. While the petitioner used to have to exhaust all available state remedies before filing a
petition for habeas relief in federal court in deference to state court proceedings, Congress has
modified this requirement in the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. Prior to the
passage of the Act, the dismissal of a mixed petition, one containing both claims that were ex-
hausted in state courts and those that were not, was without prejudice (Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S.
509, 510 (1982)). Under the new habeas statute, however, federal courts are permitted to dismiss a
mixed petition on the merits, thereby barring the petitioner from raising those claims again. Anti-
Terrorism Act § 106(b).
125. Many scholars assert that federal courts provide the best opportunity for vacating a
defendant's death sentence. Some of the possible reasons for reliance on federal courts were ad-
dressed at a recent American Bar Association panel discussion, which included timidity of elected
judges in state court to reverse the decision, ineffective assistance of counsel at the state level, and
judicial unwillingness to correct prosecutorial and state court errors. Ronald J. Tabak, Capital
Punishment: Is There Any Habeas Left in this Corpus?, 27 LoY. U. Cm. LJ. 523, 529-30 (1996).
126. Anti-Terrorism Act §§ 101,105. See infra notes 131-37 and accompanying text.
127. Anti-Terrorism Act § 106(b). See Tom C. Smith, Crime Legislation Passes in Election
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itations for the filing of habeas petitions," specified that federal courts will
defer to the conclusions of state courts,' and modified the requirements of
the filing of second or successive habeas petitions. 3
Under the Anti-Terrorism Act, a petitioner seeking to have a second or
successive habeas corpus petition heard by the district court must initially
apply for the ability to have that petition considered by a three-judge panel in
the appropriate federal Court of Appeals. 3' The Court of Appeals fulfills a
"gatekeeper" function; if the original application is denied by the court, all
successive petitions are automatically rejected by the district court.'32 The
three-judge panel's decision regarding the acceptability of subsequent petitions
is not appealable by the defendant, eliminating the appellate power of the
courts of appeal and the Supreme Court.'33 The new standards a habeas peti-
tioner must meet to file a successive habeas petition are stringent. A second or
successive petition will be dismissed unless the defendant is able to show that
he or she relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive accord-
ing to the standards established in Teague v. Lane." The petition may also
be accepted by the court when the petitioner is able to show that despite due
diligence, the factual foundation for a claim was not discoverable at the time
of trial. Based on those newly discovered facts, the defendant must show that
no reasonable factfinder could have found the defendant guilty of the underly-
ing offense.'35 The Supreme Court upheld these provisions in the Anti-Ter-
rorism Act in recent decision of Felker v. Turpin."
Year, 11 CRiM. JusT. 50 (1996); see generally Note, Blown Away? The Bill of Rights After Okla-
homa City, 109 HARv. L. REv. 2074 (1996) (discussing habeas corpus reform movements).
128. Anti-Terrorism Act §§ 101, 105. The petitioner in state custody has one year to file a
petition for habeas corpus after the latest of the following: conclusion of direct review; the remov-
al of an impediment created by state action which prevents the petitioner from filing a petition;
the Supreme Court's recognition of a new constitutional right, combined with the Court's determi-
nation that the right should be retroactively applied; or the date on which the factual basis of a
claim was discoverable. Id.
129. Id. at § 104(3).
130. Id. at § 104(4)(e)(1).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at § 106(b)(3)(E). This section indicates that "the grant or denial of an authorization
by a court of appeals to file a second or successive application shall not be appealable and shall
not be the subject of a petition for rehearing or for a writ of certiorari." Id.
134. 489 U.S. 288 (1989). For a description of retroactivity, see supra note 122.
135. Anti-Terrorism Act § 106.
136. 116 S. Ct. 2333 (1996). In Felker, the Supreme Court speedily reviewed the constitution-
ality of the Anti-Terrorism Act. See Smith, supra note 127. In an unusual decision, the Supreme
Court agreed to consider the constitutionality of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act on an expedited schedule. Id. The defendant-petitioner had been convicted of multiple offens-
es and sentenced to death. Felker, 116 S.Ct. at 2336. The Court asserted that although its review
of a judgment on an application for leave to file a successive petition for habeas was limited by
the Act, it was still able to review habeas petitions filed as original matters, thus granting the
Court original jurisdiction. Id. at 2338-39. In addition, the Court held that the gatekeeping mecha-
nism was not a new tool to evaluate petitions for habeas relief. Id. at 2340. The Court asserted
that the provision in the Act merely transferred the screening function, formerly performed by the
district court, to the courts of appeals. Id.
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B. Hatch v. Oklahoma'37
1. Facts
An Oklahoma state court convicted Hatch of two counts of first degree
murder."3 Two sentencing procedures were declared invalid. In the third at-
tempt, however, Hatch was sentenced to die by lethal injection, a decision af-
firmed by the appellate court. 39 Hatch's petitions for habeas relief were de-
nied by state and federal courts. 4
After the passage of the Anti-Terrorism Act, Hatch filed applications for a
stay of execution and for the ability to file successive habeas petitions in the
Tenth Circuit, in compliance with the Act. 4' Hatch initially asserted, howev-
er, that the Act did not apply to him because it would constitute a retroactive
application of penal legislation, prohibited by the Ex Post Facto Clause of the
Constitution.'42
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit denied the defendant's application to file subsequent
habeas petitions, as well as the application for the stay of execution."'4 The
Court determined that none of Hatch's claims met the standards established by
the Anti-Terrorism Act's requirements for second or successive petitions.'"
Hatch was executed by lethal injection on August 10, 1996."
3. Analysis
The writ of habeas corpus has been celebrated as one of the fundamental
components of the American criminal justice system.'4 In 1961, the Su-
preme Court cautioned that "there is no higher duty than to maintain [the writ]
unimpaired."'" Yet, Congress' Anti-Terrorism Act--relied on in Hatch-and
the "procedural maze" created by the Supreme Court have profoundly altered
the breadth of habeas review.'"
137. 92 F.3d 1012 (10th Cir. 1996).




142. Id. at 1014. The Ex Post Facto Clause provides that "No Bill of Attainder or ex post
facto Law shall be passed." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. The Tenth Circuit determined that
Hatch's claim did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because his application was filed two
months after the passage of the Anti-Terrorism Act. Hatch, 92 F.3d at 1014.
143. Hatch. 92 F.3d at 1017.
144. Id. at 1014-17.
145. Lois Romano, Execution Closes A Tragic Circle: Douglas's Children Watch Their
Parents' Killer Die, WASH. PosT, August 10, 1996, at A3. Interestingly, State Senator Brooks
Douglass, who witnessed Hatch's execution for the murder of his parents, authored legislation
allowing surviving relatives to witness the execution of individuals convicted of murdering their
family members. Id.
146. Stephen B. Bright, Does the Bill of Rights Apply Here Anymore? Evisceration of Habeas
Corpus and Denial of Counsel to Those Under Sentence of Death, CHAMPION, Nov., 1996, at 25.
147. Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 712-13 (1961) (quoting Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S.
19, 26 (1939)).
148. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 541 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Hatch's application for successive petitions was dismissed because it
failed to meet the requirements of the new Anti-Terrorism Act, provisions
which the White House publicly acknowledged may be unconstitutional."
By adhering to those requirements, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, like
the Supreme Court in Felker, chose brevity over thoroughness in its review of
capital cases.
The Tenth Circuit's preference for efficiency in Hatch directly contra-
venes the otherwise-settled doctrine that death is different, and because of the
uniqueness of the sentence, heightened procedural safeguards are necessary to
ensure that executions are not administered in an unconstitutional manner.
Supporters of the Act maintain that without limits, death row prisoners file
seemingly endless habeas petitions, thereby abusing the court system. The effi-
ciency of the new Act, however, has detrimental effects."5 By emphasizing
speed, the criminal justice system risks the likelihood that innocent defendants
will be executed, 5' that race will continue to infect the determination made
in the sentencing phase, 52 and that a defendant may suffer fatal conse-
quences because of an attorney's error.'3
CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' decisions in McCullah and Castro
illustrate a strong commitment to ensuring that capital defendants are afforded
due process throughout the sentencing phase of a capital case. The recent pas-
sage of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, however, may
threaten that commitment if the court sacrifices thoroughness of review for
efficiency. If the Act survives challenges to its constitutionality,'54 its amend-
ments to the habeas corpus statutes, coupled with its new provisions, will have
a significant impact on the outcome of cases brought before the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals in the future.
Cathleen Coffey
149. Tabak, supra note 125, at 523 n.1 (citing Alison Mitchell, Clinton Signs Measure on
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152. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). Statistics offered on behalf of the defen-
dant indicating that black defendants were over four times more likely to be executed than white
defendants were insufficient to "demonstrate a constitutionally significant risk of racial bias."
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 313.
153. Bright, supra note 146; see Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991). In Coleman,
the Court determined that the filing of a notice of appeal three days late in state court by the
defendant's attorney constituted a default by the defendant, thereby barring the defendant from
raising those issues in federal court. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. Bright asserts that Congress has
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